Introduction
Globalization, increasing technological complexity and a variety of other environmental, strategic, and economic factors have forced firms to shift their focus from closed innovation, which relies primarily on the internal development and application of new technologies, to a model of 'open innovation' (Chesbrough, 2003; Christensen, Olesen, and Kjaer 2005; Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009) . While the traditional closed innovation model is based on a logic of internal focus and control, the open innovation model suggests that firms increasingly open up their boundaries (Dahlander and Gann, 2010) , access external sources of knowledge and technology (Fey and Birkinshaw, 2005) , and bring in-house inventions to markets via external paths (Lichtenthaler, 2008) . Hence, firms that are adopting an open innovation model, embrace a mentality of outside-in and inside-out thinking that builds extensively on external sources of innovation and commercialization (Chesbrough, 2003 (Chesbrough, , 2006a ). As such, the core idea of open innovation refers to the exchange of knowledge of firms with a diversity of external sources (firms such as competitors, customers, start-ups, and suppliers, and universities and a range of other organizations and institutions) through different mechanisms (collaborative R&D, corporate venturing, crowdsourcing, licensing, etc.) (Grimpe and Sofka, 2009; Laursen and Salter, 2006) .
This transformation of the innovation model from a closed to an open model creates a
number of new strategic challenges. Two of the main challenges refer to the governance and control of cooperative innovation processes and the management of the intellectual property of diverse parties (Enkel, Gassmann and Chesbrough, 2009; Graham and Mowery, 2006; West, 2006) . By opening up its boundaries, the focal firm might lose some control over its resources and operations and is, therefore, likely to incur increased coordination costs (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Enkel, Gassmann, and Chesbrough, 2009 ). The governance of inter-organizational relationships through formal contracts and intellectual property rights (IPR) are, thus, seen as critical topics in the current debate about open innovation as they are both of strategic importance to open innovation firms (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006a,b) . Contracts that firms use to formalize their relationships with these external sources of innovation are defined as legally binding agreements, in writing, between two or more parties (in this context firms) that are intended to create a legal obligation or a set of obligations. IPR refer to exclusive privileges granted to owners of a variety of distinct new creations in terms of intangible assets (discoveries, inventions, and new designs). Common types of IPR include patents, trademarks, copyrights, design rights, and technical or commercial information (trade secrets).
As terms (e.g. Dahlander and Gann, 2010; Huizingh, 2011) , the debate is also largely based on some general assumptions about the behaviour and strategy of open innovation firms with little or no systematic analysis of the actual choices that these firms make when it comes to contracts and IPR in their dealings with other firms and organizations. 
Research strategy: field research and survey
For our data collection we applied two, methodologically and chronologically distinct methods that follow a two-phase design with separate qualitative field research and a quantitative survey of firms (see Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007 (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Punch, 2005) . Hence, we use an embedded research design, in which the qualitative interview data plays a supplemental role to our survey data (Creswell and Plano-Clark, 2007) . In the following, we will report on the insights from these interviews when we add some of this qualitative information to the more quantitative information from our survey research.
Throughout this paper, we will refer to this part of our research as 'field research' and, given the expected anonymity, not refer to the specific firms and managers we interviewed.
The larger part of our data collection is based on a survey that used the key informant method to collect data at the firm level for a larger group of firms active in open innovation. Our survey was designed and implemented according to Dillman's (2007) tailored design method. In order to improve our scale items and enhance the validity of the questionnaire, we extensively pre-tested our survey. First, face-to-face interviews were conducted with six academics to discuss the appropriateness of measurement items. In addition, the survey was pilot-tested with eleven open innovation managers. The managers were asked to fill out the questionnaire and to indicate any wording of the items that they thought were ambiguous. In addition, they were invited to provide suggestions for improvement of the questionnaire. In refining the questionnaire, special care was taken to ensure that the measures were applicable to managers, while still capturing the measures' theoretical concepts.
At the start of the actual survey, invitation e-mails were sent, explaining the study's purpose and requesting participation. The e-mail was carefully constructed to achieve authority and credibility. This includes assuring that responses would be treated and pre-testing, protecting respondent anonymity, ensuring subjects there were no right or wrong answers, and counterbalancing question order (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003) . In addition, statistical tests were conducted ex post to verify the quality of the survey data. We used the Harman's one-factor test by conducting an exploratory factor analysis on all variables used in the study. A principal components factors analysis reveals that there are nine factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1, which together account for about 80% of the total variance. The extraction of several distinct factors combined with the relatively low amount of variance explained by the first factor (31%) suggests that the data do not suffer from common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff, 2003) .
Given the current fatigue of firms and managers regarding surveys and the level of complexity of our survey instrument with very few yes/no questions, the current response rate appears the maximum we could reach after five rounds of contacts. In the end, this response rate leaves us with a relatively small sample. However, given the exploratory nature of our study, the interesting results and the quality of information, we are confident that the results presented below provide interesting new insights into a number of research questions regarding open innovation that so far have not, or only to a limited extent, been covered by empirical research.
Industry and firm-size characteristics of the sample
Three distinctive industries (chemicals, electronics, and business services) seem to be wellrepresented in our sample with a combined share of slightly over 60%, see table 1. Given the emphasis in our study on innovation and knowledge sharing, we also find, as in many other studies, that manufacturing industries are over-represented with a combined share of nearly 80%. Due to missing or unclear information, about 8 % of the firms that participated in our survey could not be identified in terms of their industry background.
-----insert table 1 about here -----Large firms are well-represented in the initial group of Exnovate firms, which is also reflected in the size distribution for the firms in the actual sample (see table 2 ). Very large firms (with more than ten thousand employees) account for more than 65% of the sample.
Small and medium sized firms, those that employ less than a thousand employees, reach a share of only close to 21% of our sample. This distribution is different from those found in studies on 'internal' innovation activities of firms such as those based on European CIS studies and US NSF studies where we find that, depending on where we draw the line, small and medium sized firms reach a share of close to 90%. 2 Given the complex nature of open innovation where firms not only engage in internal innovative activities but also interact with various external innovation partners, we can expect that, on average, larger firms, rather than small and medium-sized firms, have the resources to implement open innovation strategies (Chesbrough, 2003) . Recent empirical research confirms that most open innovation adopters are larger firms (Bianchi, Cavaliere, Chiaroni, Frattini, and Chiesa, 2011; Keupp and Gassmann, 2009; Lichtenthaler and Ernst, 2009 ). For many small and medium sized firms we anticipate that open innovation strategies with complex interactions with a variety of partners are much more difficult to implement (Kirschbaum, 2005) . Even though the potential of open innovation in a small and medium sized firms context has recently been stressed, these firms still rely more on internal and public information instead of using information from competitors, customers, suppliers, and other firms in their innovation process (Lee, Park and Park, 2010) . Hence, compared to the 'normal' innovation -firm size distribution, we are expected to find fewer medium sized firms and in particular fewer small firms that pursue an open innovation strategy (see also De Backer, López-Bassols, and Martinez, 2008).
-----insert table 2 about here -----
Open innovation and contracts
Chesbrough's seminal contributions (Chesbrough, 2003; 2006a,b) and that there is a risk of appropriation of innovative efforts by others (Chesbrough, 2006b) suggests that protection of innovative capabilities, not only through IPR protection but also through contractual relations with partners, might be unavoidable (see also Luoma, Paasi, and Volkokari, 2010 note that contracts can be used from a more legal perspective to control the progress of collaboration with partners as well as to monitor the progress of collaboration from a more practical process perspective (see also Argyres and Mayer, 2007; Mellewigt, Madhok, and Weibel, 2007; Reuer and Arino, 2007) . During our field research, it was stressed by every manager we interviewed how important 'exclusivity based on patents and other intellectual property' and 'protection of knowledge'
are for these open innovation firms. These firms indicate that, without IPR, they would be less inclined to cooperate with other firms as, based on their IPR protection, they are willing to invest in innovative activities that they can share with others.
Results from our survey show a more detailed perspective on the role of IPR. It turns out, see table 4, that patents and technical and commercial information (trade secrets) are seen as the most important instruments to protect the innovative capabilities of firms from their open innovation partners, as indicated by nearly 90% of the firms in our sample. Trademarks and design rights are also seen as relevant by a substantial share of firms (nearly 75% and over 65%, respectively). Given the industry breakdown of the firms in our sample, it is probably not surprising that a smaller share of firms (about 53%) see the relevance of copyrights for the protection of their innovative capabilities.
-----insert appear to be quite important as well, both for protection and signalling purposes.
----insert table 5 about here -----
The above suggests that although we can debate the degree to which in theory IPR 5 As nearly always with this line of research, there is a major concern of endogeneity which forces us to interpret most results in terms of association rather than effect.
Literature on the strategic, behavioural, and decision making aspects of open innovation differentiates between internal and external context characteristics (Huizingh, 2011; Lichtenthaler, Ernst, and Hoegl, 2010) . In line with this literature, we suggest a small set of firm specific (internal) core factors and an environmental (external) factor that are Laursen and Salter (2005) suggest that there is a direct relationship between the openness of a firm and its appropriability strategy. We expect that the degree of openness of firms, the extent to which they exchange their knowledge with others, will generate awareness with these firms as to the risk of unprotected knowledge exchange with a variety of partners.
As being open to other firms involves substantial hazards, including knowledge leakage and misappropriation, IPR can be a useful measure of protection.
Also, the more firms engage in open innovation activities with a variety of other organizations such as suppliers, customers, competitors, universities and research institutes, and start-up firms, the more complex their network of knowledge exchange with multiple partners. The higher this complexity, the more these firms will need to control their knowledge exchange. In such a complex setting, IPR are seen as effective means to protect knowledge exchange between firms (Merges, 2006) and as such, we can expect that firms that
are active in open innovation with a variety of partners will use IPR to protect their knowledge exchange. In other words, the more open firms are in terms of their external knowledge exchange, the higher their preference for IPR, see also Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2011) and Luoma, Paasi, and Valkokari (2010) .
Following suggestions by Laursen and Salter (2005) , Lichtenthaler (2011) and , we expect the absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) to impact the preference of firms for IPR. We understand the ability of firms to recognize the value of new information, to assimilate this new information and to turn this into actual innovations to indicate their absorptive capacity and also their innovative potential. In order to be able to develop this absorptive capacity, firms need to generate substantial prior related knowledge to understand the knowledge that is absorbed (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Jansen, van den Bosch, and Volberda, 2005) . Therefore, this absorptive capacity not only signals the learning potential of open innovation firms themselves, it also indicates their relevance as a source of knowledge for others. Therefore, the higher this
absorptive capacity of open innovation firms, the higher their innovative potential, the higher the risk that the knowledge that they share with their partners is appropriated by these partners, the higher their preference for IPR.
In others, the more these firms are inclined to prefer IPR protection.
As we have seen in the foregoing, open innovation firms have strong preference for formal contracts to govern their relationship with their open innovation partners. However, these firms still do differ to some extent with regard to the degree to which they value the importance of these contracts. The higher the importance of contracts for firms with open innovation partnerships, the more we can expect that this indicates the degree to which they perceive formal means of control, such as contracts, as a vital element of their business model. As such, this aspect of their business model reveals a legalistic attitude of firms that is not only related to contracts but we expect it to be also associated with the control of crucial firm knowledge through IPR. Following previous research (Luoma, Paasi, and Valkokari, 2010) , we expect that the preference of open innovation firms for formal contractual protection methods in their inter-organizational partnerships is associated with a higher preference for IPR.
As an external factor, the competitive dynamics of firms' product markets is frequently seen as a major environmental driver of their propensity to enter into a range of partnerships with other firms (Oster, 1999, Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996) . In markets where the competitive environment is subject to frequent changes, firms are more inclined to enter into partnerships with other firms, in search for new relevant knowledge. As indicated by Gassman and Henkel (2004) , Ozman (2008) and Lichtenthaler, Ernst, and Hoegl (2010) this also applies to partnerships in the context of open innovation where competitive dynamics drives open innovation collaboration. Interestingly, these competitive dynamics in firms' product markets, where they face increased competition, are also found to be an important external contingency factor for their innovative performance that demands specific attention to IPR (Hausman and Leonard, 2006; Somaya, 2003) . In the current context of open innovation, this suggests that higher levels of competitive dynamics in firms' products markets affect their preference for IPR. The protection of open innovation firms' knowledge to be exchanged with their partners is of particular relevance in dynamic product markets where the competitive landscape and its players are changing rapidly. Under these conditions, where firms collaborate to improve their innovative performance, while facing increasing competition, they are expected to value IPR to protect the innovative knowledge that they exchange with a variety of partners. Hence, the higher levels of competitive dynamics in open innovation firms' product markets, while sharing knowledge to improve their innovative performance, the higher their preference for IPR.
Description of variables and measures
Our (Chesbrough, 2006a,b; Christensen, Olesen, and Kjaer, 2005; Lichtenthaler, 2011 Competitive dynamics was measured through the extent to which firms indicated that their competitive environment is expected to change over the next five years. A dummy variable was created by collapsing 'less competitive' and 'similar level of competitiveness'
into the category of low competitiveness, while the answer option 'more competitive' builds the category of high competitiveness.
Our analysis also includes a small set of control variables. To control for firm size, we included the logarithm of the number of employees. Given our cross-industry sample, we also control for industry effects. We grouped the sample firms into the following three classes:
processing (including chemicals and food), manufacturing, and others. For the last two classes we included a dummy variable (1 = pertaining to this industry; 0 = not pertaining to this industry). The same method was applied to control for the firm's country of origin, by including a dummy for US (0) versus non-US firms (1).
Results
We used OLS regression models to analyse the relationship between the identified set of -----insert table 7 about here -----Due to our relatively small sample size, we have a limited number of observations per estimated parameter, which might lead to 'overfitting' the sample (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2006) . In order to validate our results, we used bootstrapping as an alternative estimation procedure, which produces more accurate estimates for small sample sizes (Borwnstone and Valletta, 2001 ) (see the Appendix). The bootstrap analysis generates qualitatively similar results, the only difference is that 'competitive dynamics' becomes significant at the 5% level (see the table in 
Discussion and conclusions
Our research indicates that in terms of the governance of their collaborative innovative activities, firms active in open innovation appear to follow a somewhat 'unadventurous'
strategy. This strategy is much more in line with what could be expected according to wellaccepted organizational economics theory (e.g. Williamson, 1985) that is closer to Chesbrough (2006a,b) than to a more 'radical' open innovation approach, as advocated by Baldwin and von Hippel (2011), von Hippel and von Krogh (2006) and Pénin (2011 (Almirall and Casadesus-Masanell, 2010; Hagedoorn and Hesen, 2007; Lee, Nystén-Haarala, and Huhtilaienen, 2010) . Also, both the control and the monitoring dimension of contracts, the degree to which firms use contracts from a legal or from a practical process perspective, appear to be relevant for open innovation collaboration.
In line with those contributions that stress the role that IPR should play in open innovation (e.g. Dubiansky, 2006; Graham and Mowery, 2006; Pisano and Teece, 2007; Sandulli and Chesbrough, 2009) Finally, our research is based on two complementary approaches, a series of in-depth interviews and a survey, and it does provide us with some new insights, yet it also has some shortcomings. Most prominently: our sample is, despite several attempts to increase its size, relatively small which not only limits the extent to which we can analyse various firm and industry characteristics associated with open innovation, it also limits the degree to which we can generalize our findings. As such, our research is a modest contribution, albeit one of the first contributions, to a research agenda that empirically considers the governance of open innovation and the role of various legal and contractual implications of open innovation.
Despite these limitations that come with the exploratory nature of our research, we are confident that our findings so far do reveal some interesting patterns and insights that can be used for further study of the implications of the current open innovation practice for the governance of inter-firm relationships and the use of IPR. 
Appendix -Bootstrapping Analysis
Bootstrapping can be used for validating a multivariate model by drawing a large number of subsamples -with replacement from the original observed data -and estimating models for each subsample (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham, 2006) . The estimates from these subsamples are then combined to derive coefficients and standard errors. For small sample sizes the bootstrap approximation should be more accurate than standard large-sample analytical techniques (Brownstone and Valletta, 2001 4 Under ' copyleft' conditions, any invention can freely be used by others but it is required that all modified and extended versions of the invention are free as well.
5 Given our sample size (n=86), we are very limited in terms of the number of variables to be included in the statistical analysis. In addition, some potential variables were not included as they are highly correlated with other variables. Moreover, using most of these potential variables would, due to missing values, decrease the sample size even further. 6 As some of the independent variables had missing values, we adopted several approaches for dealing with these missing values. Table 7 displays the OLS results with pairwise deletion.
Listwise deletion (n = 76) and multiple imputation generated qualitatively similar results, with the exception of 'competitive dynamics' which became significant at the 5% level.
